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ferred when the market is thin and when alternatives for the good
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disclaimer applies.When are Retail Stores Preferable to Auctions?
It is commonly alleged that an auction should be run whenever the seller wants to maximize
the proceeds from selling a good that potential buyers value diﬀerently. In practice, however,
most goods are actually sold using store structures, in which the seller simply posts a price and
the ﬁrst buyer that agrees to pay that price gets the good. How can this dominance of stores
be explained?
Although advantageous at ﬁrst sight, auction schemes have two undesirable features that
restrict their use in many practical situations. The ﬁrst is the waiting cost they impose on
bidders: in order to command a price premium above the reservation price, any form of auction
requires several bids to accumulate before it is actually run. As a result, there is usually
a certain waiting period between the time an auction is announced (when the good would
actually be available for sale) and the time the winner is determined (when the good becomes
available to the buyer).
The second problem with auctions is related to the uncertainty they impose on bidders. To
see this, consider a buyer seeking to purchase a bottle of milk for his next breakfast that bids
in a milk auction. Until the auction is closed, he does not know whether he made the winning
bid or not. If he sees another opportunity to purchase milk, let it be a store or an auction, he
faces the following dilemma. If he does not purchase the milk there, he runs a signiﬁcant risk
of not having milk the next morning. On the other hand, if he does purchase milk in the store
or chooses to bid on the second auction, he takes the risk of ending up with two bottles of milk.
Thus, auctions can potentially give rise to a signiﬁcant amount of false trading: some buyers
that would agree to pay more than the market clearing price do not get the item, whereas
buyers that wouldn’t agree to pay as much as the clearing price get it because they are locked
in by the auction scheme. This risk of false trading has important consequences for the way
auctions are designed. Since bidders will not wish to submit bids too long before the auction
closes, sellers will typically choose to run auctions that close at a pre-speciﬁed time and not
after a certain number of bids has been received.
Intuitively, one would expect waiting costs and the risk of false trading to make the auction a
less appealing selling institution than the store. This paper presents a formal model conﬁrming
this intuition. We model bidders’ waiting costs and the risk of false trading by assuming that
bidders having to wait for the auction to close will engage in a search process to purchase
the good elsewhere. When such a purchase opportunity is found, a bidder that was originally
planning to participate in the auction drops out. With less bidders participating in the auction,
1the seller’s expected revenue falls. As a result, the costs imposed on bidders by the auction get
internalized by the seller and he is more likely to sell the good using a store structure rather
than an auction.
Our results show that the optimal choice of the store as opposed to the auction structure is
driven by three factors: (1) the extent to which the good being sold is perishable and/or the
seller has a strong time preference, (2) the thickness of the market, and (3) the size of bidders’
waiting costs and the extent to which alternatives to purchase the good elsewhere are available.
More speciﬁcally, the following results can be established:
1. If the good is perishable, becomes obsolete quickly and/or the seller has a strong time
preference, then the store is the preferred structure. This eﬀect arises because perisha-
bility and discounting make it more costly for the seller to wait for additional bidders
before closing the auction. As a result, the optimal auction has a small expected number
of bidders, and the store may dominate.
2. If the market is thick in the sense that the rate of bidder arrivals is high, the auction is
the preferred structure. This eﬀect arises because when the rate of bidder arrivals rises,
the gain in expected selling price per unit time the seller waits before closing the auction
is increased, making it worth to wait for a large number of bidders.
3. If bidders’ waiting costs are high and/or alternatives for the good are easy to ﬁnd, then
the store is the preferred structure. This eﬀect arises because if bidders defect quickly,
the auction is unable to achieve the level of bidder participation required to make the
expected selling price rise signiﬁcantly above the reservation price.
Our results therefore demonstrate that the thickness of a market can be a critical factor for
the choice between store and auction. Furthermore, they provide a rationale for the conventional
wisdom that goods that are “unique” (in the sense of having no close substitutes) and durable
(not perishable) should be sold through auctions, while perishable goods or goods with close
substitutes for which ﬁnding an alternative is easy should be sold through a store structure.
Although a number of papers deal with the optimal design of selling institutions, none has
considered the issues addressed in this paper. Most of the literature is concerned with the
optimal design of stores or auctions considered in isolation, and not with the optimal choice
between these two structures. The literature on stores has mainly analyzed the question of
how an optimal price or a price-quantity schedule should be set. For example, Spence (1977)
develops an optimal quantity discount scheme for a monopolist facing customers with diﬀerent
2valuations for diﬀerent quantities, while Lazear (1986) analyzes the optimal time path of prices
when the seller faces uncertainty about the market for the item being sold. On the other hand,
starting with the pioneering work of Vickrey (1961), the auction design literature has focused on
the choice among diﬀerent auctioning schemes (Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981),
Bulow and Roberts (1989)).
Of the few papers comparing stores and auctions, none has considered bidders’ waiting costs
and the problems associated with false trading as explanations for the dominance of stores.
For instance, Wang (1993) considers the optimal choice between store and auction from the
perspective of the explicit costs of running these two institutions. He shows that the advantage
of running auctions periodically instead of selling goods using a store arises from the fact that
the storage costs incurred by the auction are typically lower than the displaying costs incurred
by a store. He demonstrates that auctions tend to dominate stores when the dispersion of
buyers’ valuations is high. The intuition for this result is that an auction allows the seller
to extract the second-order statistic of bidders’ valuations, whereas the store does not. This
feature is more valuable, the more dispersed bidders’ valuations are. However, since his analysis
completely ignores the waiting costs auctions impose on bidders, his results tend to be biased
in favor of the auction.
De Vany (1987) compares stores, time-based auctions (which close after a ﬁxed time has
elapsed) and thickness-based auctions (which close once a certain number of bids has been
received) from the perspective of transactions costs. He shows that the higher expected selling
price in the auction structures can be oﬀset by their higher transactions costs, which, in his
model, are captured by the seller’s holding cost and the buyers’ inspection and waiting cost.
As a result of these higher transactions costs, the store typically dominates the two auctioning
schemes when the prior distribution of buyer valuations is not too diﬀuse. When dispersion is
high, however, the auction tends to be the preferred structure. Although De Vany computes
bidders’ waiting cost explicitly in his analysis, he does not allow bidders facing high waiting
costs to search for alternatives and defect from the auction. As a result, his results are also
biased towards the auction.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the store. Section 2
considers the properties of the optimal auction. Section 3 compares the two selling institutions
and derives conditions under which each of those forms dominates. Section 4 concludes.
31 The Store
Consider a risk-neutral seller trying to sell a single unit of an indivisible good using a store. He
announces a listing price p for the good; the ﬁrst customer that agrees to pay the listed price
gets the good.
Potential customers arrive according to a Poisson process with intensity ¸, implying that the
customer interarrival time is exponentially distributed with parameter ¸. Each potential buyer
i has a valuation vi for the good, which is random, independent of other buyers’ valuations and
has distribution function F and density f with support [v;v]. The customer buys the good if
vi > p. If his valuation is below vi, the good remains available for sale to another customer.
Let ® > 0 denote the discount rate for this problem, which can be interpreted either as the
seller’s time preference, as the extent to which the item being sold is perishable, or as the speed
with which it becomes obsolete.1 Let 0 · R < v denote the seller’s reservation utility if the
good goes unsold. In the spirit of dynamic programming, R can be viewed as summarizing all
the future of the problem (except for the eﬀect of discounting, which is contained in e¡®t); it
could represent either the utility the seller derives from consuming the good himself, or the
expected revenue from a subsequent sale.
The store owner’s problem is to set a price schedule fptg that maximizes the expected revenue
from the sale, ΠS. Given pt and the distribution of buyers’ valuations, for any customer walking
into the store at time t, the good will be sold with probability 1 ¡ F(pt). Thus, the store’s
expected revenue is pt(1 ¡ F(pt)). With probability F(pt), the good will not be sold, and the








¡¸t (pt(1 ¡ F(pt)) + F(pt)R)dt (1)
where ¸e¡¸t is the density of interarrival times and e¡®t captures the eﬀect of perishability and
discounting. With R given, one can do no better than maximizing pt(1¡F(pt))+F(pt)R time
by time, yielding the ﬁrst-order condition
1 ¡ F(pt) ¡ ptf(pt) + f(pt)R = 0 (2)
1In the ﬁrst interpretation, all amounts received by the seller are simply discounted at a rate ®. In the second
and third interpretation, bidders’ valuations for the good would be decaying exponentially through time, with
a time-dependent distribution F(v;t) rescaled so as to lie on the support [e¡®tv;e¡®tv] (the same would apply
to the reservation utility R). Both of these cases can be handled with the formulation used below and yield
similar conclusions.
4which immediately implies that pt is a constant independent of time, p¤, satisfying the usual
hazard rate formula,
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Note that since p¤ = R +
1¡F(p¤)
f(p¤) > R, p¤(1 ¡ F(p¤)) + F(p¤)R > R and therefore ΠS > ¸
®+¸R.
As a result, there exists some ®¤ > 0 such that the seller derives more than his reservation
utility from selling the good whenever ® < ®¤. This result, which will be important below, is
summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Let p¤ = R +
1¡F(p¤)
f(p¤) . Then, for all ® < ®¤ = ¸
(p¤¡R)(1¡F(p¤))
R , the seller’s
expected utility from the sale, ΠS, is strictly greater than his reservation utility R.
Proof: Immediate by solving the condition ΠS = ¸
®+¸ (p¤(1 ¡ F(p¤)) + F(p¤)R) > R for
®.
Proposition 1 has the obvious implication that if the discount rate is very high (either
because the seller has a very high time preference, the good is very perishable or becomes
obsolete quickly), then the seller will not even attempt to sell the good and prefer to consume
it himself (trivially, attempting a sale is always optimal if R = 0).
2 The Auction
2.1 The Model
Suppose now that the seller decides to sell the good using an auction. He announces a reser-
vation price p and the auction’s closing time T. Bidders that arrive before T are allowed to
submit bids for the good. At time T, the highest bidder gets the good at a price equal to the
second-highest bid or the reservation price p, whichever is greater.2
2Given the equivalence theorem for independent private value auctions (Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson
(1981)), this assumption is innocuous for the optimality of the auction as opposed to the store in the setting
considered here, but simpliﬁes the exposition as bidders bid their true valuation.
5In order to be able to compare store and auction, the same arrival process and the same
valuation distribution as in the case of the store are assumed. However, one cannot simply
assume that all the bidders that show up end up actually bidding in the auction. Because of
the auction’s distinctive property of closing only at time T, bidders that arrive before T must
wait before they know whether they get the good. As a consequence of the direct cost of waiting
and the potential cost of false trading, bidders do not submit their bids as soon as they arrive.
Rather, they search for opportunities to buy the good elsewhere and come back to bid in the
auction only if they have found no suitable alternative by time T.
Suppose that alternative purchase opportunities are idiosyncratic to each bidder and arrive
exponentially at rate ¹ for each individual bidder engaged in the search process. Assuming
such a distribution for the time until a bidder ﬁnds an outside option can be considered as the
limiting case of a situation in which bidders visit a certain number of places per unit time until
the auction closes and there is a certain probability that they ﬁnd a suitable good in each of
these places (note that the good need not be strictly identical to the one being auctioned, as
some bidders will choose to purchase an inferior alternative because they do not want to wait).
In practical applications, the value of ¹ will depend positively on two factors, each having its
own economic interpretation: on how important immediacy of the purchase is to bidders (with
high direct waiting costs leading them to search for alternatives more intensively or to decide
to purchase goods that are inferior to the one being auctioned), and on the extent to which
substitutes for the good being auctioned exist (which would typically be high for commodity
products and low for original artwork). Note that if many substitutes exist, then the probability
that bidders ﬁnd an alternative by time T is high and so would be the risk of false trading if
bidders chose to submit their bids as soon as they arrive (i.e., before searching for alternatives).
The number of bidders that participate in the auction at time T, N, equals the number
of bidder arrivals minus the number of bidders that have found an alternative by time T.
Thus, as shown in the Appendix, N follows a Poisson distribution with parameter ˜ ¸(T) =
¸





To gain some intuition for this result, recall that the expected number of bidders in the auction




¡¹T > 0 (7)
6and
@2˜ ¸(T)
@T 2 = ¡¸¹e
¡¹T < 0 (8)
Therefore, as the seller waits longer before closing the auction, the expected number of bidders
does increase, but at a decreasing rate because some of the bidders ﬁnd an alternative and drop





1 + ¹T ¡ e¹T¢
< 0). As will be
shown shortly, it is this phenomenon which potentially makes the auction inferior to the store
as a selling institution and explains the dominance of store structures in practice. Note that if
bidders do not have outside options (¹ ! 0), ˜ ¸(T) ! ¸T, the special case analyzed by Wang
(1993) in which the auction dominates the store in most cases.
The seller’s utility from auctioning the good at time T, ΠA(T), is equal to the present value
of the expectation over N of the revenue from an auction with N bidders, ¼N:
ΠA(T) = e
¡®TE(¼N) (9)
where ® again denotes the discount rate. The seller’s problem is to select an auctioning time
T and a reservation price p so as to maximize this expression.
In order to determine the value of ¼N, let R again denote the reservation utility derived by
the seller if the good goes unsold at time T. In the spirit of dynamic programming, the value of
R can be considered as given and equal to that for the store, as a seller unable to sell his good in
either structure – store or auction – will subsequently use the optimal selling strategy. At time
T, a sale will occur if the highest bid is above the reservation price, p. If N bids are received
at time T, then the probability of a sale equals 1 ¡ F N(p). Conditional on a sale occurring,
the revenue from the auction equals the second-highest-order statistic of bidders’ valuation if
it lies above the reservation price p, and the reservation price if it does not. Using the density
function of the second-highest-order statistic, N(N ¡1)(1¡F)F N¡2f, the probability that the
highest-order statistic lies above the reservation price but the second-highest does not is given
by3




N(N ¡ 1)(1 ¡ F(y))F
N¡2(y)f(y)dy
= (1 ¡ F
N(p)) ¡ (1 ¡ F
N(p) ¡ NF
N¡1(p)(1 ¡ F(p))) (10)
= NF
N¡1(p)(1 ¡ F(p))
3This can also be seen by considering the joint density of the highest-order statistic x1 and the








p NFN¡1(p)f(x1)dx1 = NFN¡1(p)(1 ¡ F(p)).
7With probability F N(p), the good goes unsold, and the seller receives the reservation utility R.




yN(N ¡ 1)(1 ¡ F(y))F
N¡2(y)f(y)dy + pNF
N¡1(p)(1 ¡ F(p)) + F
N(p)R (11)





1)F N¡2(y)(1 ¡ F(y))f(y)dy and F N(p) = 1 ¡
R v












N¡1(y)(J(y) ¡ R)f(y)dy (12)
where J(y) ´ y ¡
1¡F(y)
f(y) denotes the Bulow and Roberts (1989) marginal revenue function.
Equation (12) is the standard result that the expected utility from an auction is equal to the
expectation of the maximum of the highest bidder’s marginal revenue and reservation utility
(see Bulow and Klemperer (1996)). Note that because it is the conditional expectation of an
order statistic, ¼N is an increasing and concave function of N.
Taking the ﬁrst-order condition on (12), the optimal reservation price p¤ solves J(p¤) = R,
or, using the deﬁnition of J,
p




Note that consistent with the Riley and Samuelson (1981) result, the optimal reservation price
p¤ does not depend on the number of bidders participating in the auction and is identical to
the store’s posted price.
Let ¼(˜ ¸) = E(¼N). Since ˜ ¸ = ˜ ¸(T), the seller’s expected utility from an auction taking place
at time T can be written as
ΠA(T) = e








Using the expression for ¼N, one can rewrite the above in an alternate form convenient to derive























¡˜ ¸(T)(1¡F(y))(J(y) ¡ R)f(y)dy
1
A (15)
2.2 Properties of the Optimal Auction
Using expressions (14) and (15), the properties of the optimal auction can now be determined.
To start with, one can establish that the properties of ¼N, which is an increasing and concave
function of N, carry over to ¼ as a function of ˜ ¸.
Proposition 2: ¼(˜ ¸) = E(¼N) is increasing and concave in ˜ ¸.
Proof: We ﬁrst establish that ¼ is increasing in ˜ ¸. Taking the ﬁrst derivative of ¼ with











































(¼N+1 ¡ ¼N) > 0 (17)
To establish concavity, diﬀerentiate ¼ one more time to obtain
@2¼














































Grouping terms of like powers of ˜ ¸ then yields
@2¼






(¼N+2 ¡ 2¼N+1 + ¼N) < 0 (19)
Since ˜ ¸(T) is strictly increasing and concave in T, proposition 2 implies that the expected
(undiscounted) revenue from the auction will be strictly increasing and concave in the auction’s














@T2 < 0. This property is caused
by the nature of ¼N as the conditional expectation of an order statistic.
Therefore, choosing the auction’s optimal closing time T involves a tradeoﬀ for the seller: on
the one hand, a higher T increases the expected number of bidders participating in the auction,
˜ ¸(T) and therefore the expected revenue from the sale ¼. On the other hand, as the closing
time T is increased, discounting reduces the present value of the proceeds. The optimal closing
time T ¤ is the one that balances these two eﬀects.
As in the case of the store, if the discount rate is very high, the seller may even decide
to consume the good on his own rather than trying to auction it. More speciﬁcally, one can
establish the following result:




the seller prefers not to auction the good.
Proof: To establish this result, it suﬃces to show that if the above condition is met,


























¡˜ ¸(T)(1¡F(y))(J(y) ¡ R)
³
1 ¡ ˜ ¸(T)(1 ¡ F(y))
´
f(y)dy (21)











(J(y) ¡ R)f(y)dy (22)












(J(y) ¡ R)f(y)dy ¡ ®R · 0 (23)
Solving for ® then establishes the condition for optimality of no sale. In order to establish that
no other T can yield a higher expected revenue, it suﬃces to show that ΠA is concave in T.
Note that
@2ΠA




















10Using the concavity of ¼ and ˜ ¸, the term in parentheses is negative. But this implies that at
any point where
@ΠA
@T = 0, ΠA is concave in T, implying that all T such that
@ΠA
@T = 0 must
be maxima. As ΠA is (weakly) decreasing at T = 0, it cannot reach a maximum for some
T > 0 without ﬁrst reaching a minimum. As there can be no such minima, ΠA can have no
maxima other than T ¤ = 0 either, implying that T ¤ = 0 (meaning that the seller just gets his




The economic intuition behind proposition 3 is straightforward: if the discount rate lies
above the instantaneous proportional gain from auctioning the good (which is equal to the




R ), it is not worth running an auction, and the seller prefers
consuming the good himself (trivially, a sale is again always optimal if R = 0). If the discount
rate lies below that critical value, it is worth for the seller to wait some positive time T, hoping
that at least one bidder will show up for the auction. Therefore, the seller chooses to close the
auction after a ﬁxed interval T > 0. Conversely, as the rate of bidder arrivals ¸ increases, the
average number of bidders participating in the auction and the expected gain from waiting for
additional bidders increases, and the seller is more likely to attempt a sale.
It is worth noting that the conditions in propositions 1 and 3 are in fact equivalent. Indeed,


























Thus, whenever ® ¸ ¸
(p¤¡R)(1¡F(p¤))
R , not selling the good is the optimal strategy, and neither
store nor auction are run. We now show that if the above condition for optimality of no sale is
not met, an auction with positive T will be optimal. Moreover, the auction’s optimal closing
time T ¤ is unique:
Proposition 4: Whenever 0 < ® < ¸
(p¤¡R)(1¡F(p¤))
R , there exists a unique T ¤ > 0 maxi-
mizing (14).
Proof: Recall that whenever ® < ¸
(p¤¡R)(1¡F(p¤))
R , ΠA is increasing in T at T = 0, and that
ΠA(0) = R > 0. Therefore, the existence of an optimal T ¤ > 0 can be established by noting






¡®T¼(˜ ¸(T)) = 0 < ΠA(0) (26)
To establish uniqueness, it suﬃces to show that ΠA is concave in T for all T such that
@ΠA=@T = 0, a result that was already derived in the proof of proposition 3.
The results in propositions 3 and 4 arise because of the tradeoﬀ between waiting for more
bidders to show up (which increases the expected revenue from the sale) and the eﬀect of
discounting (which reduces its present value). Note that in the special case in which ® ! 0, it
is optimal for the seller to wait a very long time before closing the auction, and the expected
payoﬀ from the auction is v.
As mentioned above, if the discount rate is suﬃciently high, the seller will prefer consuming
the good on his own and will run neither store nor auction. In what follows, we therefore
assume that ® < ¸
(p¤¡R)(1¡F(p¤))
R , so that the seller does attempt a sale and the question of
which structure is preferable (i.e., store or auction) becomes relevant.
Our next results deals with the eﬀect of changes in the discount rate ®, the rate of bidder
arrivals ¸ and the availability of outside options ¹ on the value of the auction.
Proposition 5: ΠA(T ¤) is strictly decreasing in the discount rate ® and the availability of
outside options ¹ and strictly increasing in market thickness ¸.
Proof: Note that for all T > 0,
@ΠA
@® = ¡Te¡®T¼(˜ ¸) < 0, @Π
@¹ = e¡®T @¼(˜ ¸)
@˜ ¸
@˜ ¸
@¹ < 0 and
@ΠA
@¸ = e¡®T @¼
@˜ ¸
@˜ ¸
@¸ > 0. Therefore, the claimed relationships must hold as well for the optimal
T ¤.
The next three results describe how the properties of the optimal auction depend on the
discount rate ®, the rate of bidder arrivals ¸ and the availability of outside options ¹.














and we have shown in proposition 4 that @2ΠA=@T 2 < 0 whenever @ΠA=@T = 0, the sign of



























¡®T¼ < 0 (28)
establishing the result.
Since ˜ ¸(T) is strictly increasing in T, proposition 6 implies that as the seller becomes more
impatient and/or the good more perishable, the expected number of bidders participating in
the auction, ˜ ¸, falls.
When varying ¸ and ¹, the optimal expected number of bidders chosen by the seller, ˜ ¸(T ¤)
is a more appropriate description of the seller’s auctioning strategy than the auction’s closing
time T ¤, which by itself does not say much about how the auction will look like in terms of
bidder participation. Rather than the auction’s closing time T, the next two results therefore
consider the eﬀect of ¸ and ¹ on the optimal ˜ ¸(T ¤).
Proposition 7: The expected number of bidders in the optimal auction, ˜ ¸(T ¤), is an




T=T¤ is increasing in ¸.






Next, observe that by concavity of ¼, Φ(˜ ¸) =
@¼=@˜ ¸
¼ is a strictly decreasing function of ˜ ¸. Using
the fact that @˜ ¸
@T = ¸e¡¹T = ¸ ¡ ˜ ¸¹, (29) can be rewritten as
Φ(˜ ¸)(¸ ¡ ˜ ¸¹) = ® (30)
Suppose now that ¸ is increased, and hold all other parameters constant. Then, ¸ ¡ ˜ ¸¹
increases, so for the ﬁrst-order condition (30) to hold, Φ(˜ ¸) must fall, implying that ˜ ¸ must
rise, establishing the ﬁrst result. To establish the second result, note that since Φ(˜ ¸) has
decreased in the new optimum, @˜ ¸
@T = ¸e¡¹T = ¸ ¡ ˜ ¸¹ must have increased.
Proposition 8: The expected number of bidders in the optimal auction, ˜ ¸(T ¤), is a






Proof: As in the proof of proposition 6, rewrite the ﬁrst-order condition as Φ(˜ ¸)(¸¡˜ ¸¹) =
®. Holding all other parameters constant, increase ¹. Then, ¸ ¡ ˜ ¸¹ falls, so for the ﬁrst-
order condition to hold, Φ(˜ ¸) must increase, implying that ˜ ¸ must fall, establishing the ﬁrst
13result. To establish the second result, note that since Φ(˜ ¸) has increased in the new optimum,
@˜ ¸
@T = ¸e¡¹T = ¸ ¡ ˜ ¸¹ must have decreased.
The results on the properties of the optimal auction derived in this section make intuitive
sense: if ® is low, so that waiting is not too costly, then the seller waits a long time before
closing the auction. If ¸ is high, so that the market is thick, then the seller increases the
expected number of bidders in the optimal auction, ˜ ¸. Finally, if ¹ is high, so that bidders’
waiting costs are high or alternatives for the good are easy to ﬁnd, the expected number of
bidders in the optimal auction is reduced.
These results imply that if ® or ¹ are high or ¸ is low, the expected number of bidders in the
auction ˜ ¸ will be low. With a low ˜ ¸, the probability of having more than one bidder show up in
the auction will be low as well, and the auction will look more a store in the limit. Therefore,
one could expect the store to dominate the auction for high ® and ¹ and for low ¸. The next
section shows that this is indeed the case.
3 The Optimal Market Structure
We now turn to the question of which market structure – store or auction – will be optimal
for the seller. We ﬁrst present a general condition under which the auction can dominate the
store. In a second step, we show how the optimality of the store or the auction depends on the
seller’s time preference and the extent to which the good is perishable (®), the thickness of the
market (¸) and the extent of waiting costs and availability of outside options (¹).
Proposition 9: The auction is the preferred structure if and only if there exists some
˜ ¸ 2 [0;¸=¹] (for ¹ 6= 0) or some ˜ ¸ ¸ 0 (for ¹ = 0) such that
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Using the fact that ˜ ¸ = ¸





for ¹ 6= 0 and T =
˜ ¸
¸ for ¹ = 0. Thus, e¡®T =
³




for ¹ 6= 0 and e¡®˜ ¸=¸ for ¹ = 0.
Substituting into (31), the result follows.
14The intuition for proposition 9 is the following: for the auction to be able to dominate the
store, two things are required:
1. First, a suﬃcient number of bidders ˜ ¸ must be able to accumulate in order for ¼(˜ ¸) to
rise signiﬁcantly above the expected payoﬀ from the store. The maximum achievable
number of bidders in the auction, limT!1 = ¸
¹, depends positively on market thickness
and negatively on waiting costs and false trading.
2. Second, this accumulation must occur suﬃciently quickly so that the payoﬀ from the





¹ , this accumulation will occur faster, the higher ¸ and the lower ¹.
Note that a high ¸ and a low ¹ positively aﬀect both factors required for the auction to
dominate the store. This is best illustrated using a numerical example. Suppose that bidders’
valuations are uniformly distributed on the interval [0;1]. Then, the reservation price for both
store and auction is given by p¤ = 1+R
2 , and one has











dy = 1 ¡ 2




Therefore, the condition for the auction to dominate is that there exists a ˜ ¸ such that
³


















The expected revenue from the auction as a function of ˜ ¸ and the expected revenue of the store
are depicted in Figure 1 for three diﬀerent situations. In the base case with ¸ = 5 and ¹ = 1
(top panel), the auction (dotted line) slightly dominates the store (solid line) if a ˜ ¸ around 2 is
selected. If the drop-out rate ¹ is increased to 2:5 (middle panel), then the auction no longer
dominates the store: no ˜ ¸ can be found such that (31) is satisﬁed. Finally, if the arrival rate ¸
is increased to 10 (lower panel), the auction dominates the store more clearly than in the base
case.
This numerical example suggests that a high market thickness and low availability of substi-
tutes should make dominance of the auction more likely. The analysis that follows shows that
this intuition is correct. The next result deals with market thickness and demonstrates that if
the rate of bidder arrivals is suﬃciently high, then the auction will be the preferred structure.



































Figure 1: The choice between store (solid line) and auction (dotted line) de-
pending on market thickness ¸ and waiting costs ¹ (value of the parameters:
® = 1, R = 0, f¸;¹g 2 ff5;1g;f5;2:5g;f10;1gg.
Proposition 10: For all parameter constellations (®;¹) such that selling is optimal (® <
¸
(p¤¡R)(1¡F(p¤))
R ), there exists a rate of bidder arrivals ¸0 such that auctioning is optimal if
¸ > ¸0.
Proof: Auctioning will be optimal if
ΠA(T) = e
























+ ˜ ¸(T)(1 ¡ e
®T)¼1 + (¼0 ¡ e
®T¼1) > 0 (36)
Now, choose T small enough such that ¼2 ¡ e®T¼1 > 0, i.e. T <
ln(¼2=¼1)
® (this assumption is
innocuous, as if the auction dominates for that “arbitrarily” chosen T, it will necessarily do so
for the optimal T ¤ as well), and consider the limit as ¸ ! 1, which for constant T implies
˜ ¸(T) ! 1. The summation term contains only positive terms by construction and therefore
16tends to plus inﬁnity in polynomial progression, whereas the second term tends to minus inﬁnity
linearly and the third term is constant. Therefore, for constant T, the whole expression tends
to plus inﬁnity as ¸ ! 1, and the auction will be preferred to the store for large enough ¸.
The intuition for proposition 10 is straightforward. If the rate of bidder arrivals is high,
many bidders will accumulate even if the auction’s closing time is small, and it is worth for the
seller to run an auction rather than a store because of the higher expected selling price. This
result is consistent with a number of empirical observations. For example, the market for fresh
ﬁsh and the Amsterdam fresh ﬂower market, which are characterized by high thickness (with
all interested bidders showing up every morning at the announced time to bid), are typically
run using auctions. An interesting implication of proposition 8 is that the optimal way to sell
the same good, with the same distribution of bidder valuations, can be either a store or an
auction depending on the thickness of the market. This has been observed on the California
real-estate market, where houses, which had historically been sold using posted prices (i.e., a
“store”), were commonly auctioned as the market became thick in the late 1990’s.
Turning to bidders’ waiting cost and false trading, the next result shows that if bidders’
waiting costs are high or alternatives are easy to ﬁnd, the seller will always prefer a store.
Proposition 11: For all parameter constellations (®;¸) such that selling is optimal (® <
¸
(p¤¡R)(1¡F(p¤))
R ), there exists a rate of arrival of outside options ¹0 such that the seller always
prefers the store to the auction if ¹ > ¹0.
Proof: Since ® < ¸
(p¤¡R)(1¡F(p¤))
R , we know that the seller’s expected utility from running
the store is ΠS > R, so all we need to show is that for ¹ high enough, he will achieve at most
R using an auction. Note that for all T, lim¹!1 ˜ ¸(T) = 0, so it follows from (15) that for
all T ¸ 0, lim¹!1 ΠA(T) = e¡®TR · R, and the store is therefore strictly preferred to the
auction if ¹ is suﬃciently high. The uniqueness of the critical ¹0 follows from the fact that ΠA
is strictly decreasing in ¹ for all T > 0 while ΠS does not depend on ¹.
The result in Proposition 11 does tell us that waiting costs and false trading play a critical
role in the choice between store and auction, but it does not allow a precise characterization of
when an auction or a store will be preferred. The next proposition puts a much tighter bound
on the parameter constellations under which auctions can arise as optimal selling institutions.









(p¤¡R)(1¡F(p¤)) cannot dominate a store.


























¤ ¡ R)(1 ¡ F(p
¤)) ¡ ®R) (38)
Using the deﬁnition of g(˜ ¸) and the fact that
R v
p (J(y) ¡ R)f(y)dy = (p¤ ¡ R)(1 ¡ F(p¤)), the
result follows.
Proposition 12 implies that for the auction to be able to dominate the store, a minimum
expected number of bidders ˜ ¸ is required in the auction. This is because the beneﬁt of using
an auction as opposed to a store stems from the fact that a price higher than the reservation
price p¤ can be extracted. This, however, can only occur if the average number of bidders is
suﬃciently high.
Proposition 12 is best illustrated using a numerical example. Suppose again that that bid-







































































2 are depicted in Figure 2 for ¸ = 5 and ¸ = 10. Note that
the minimum expected number of bidders in the auction ˜ ¸ below which the store will be the
preferred structure is greater than 1 and becomes larger, the larger the arrival rate ¸. This is
because the store becomes more proﬁtable as ¸ is increased.
The result of proposition 12 is related to proposition 9 but somewhat weaker, as the eﬀect of
the time required for bidders to accumulate on the value of the sale is not taken explicitly into
account. Nevertheless, it is a very convenient starting point to derive results that allow to rule
out the dominance of the auction in many cases. The reason is that the rate ¹ at which bidders



























Figure 2: Minimum value of ˜ ¸ below which the store is always preferred to the
auction (value of the parameters: ® = 1, R = 0, ¸ 2 f5;10g.
ﬁnd alternatives constrains the maximum expected number of bidders ˜ ¸ that the seller can
achieve in an auction. Therefore, knowing that there exists a critical ˜ ¸ below which the store
will dominate the auction, and since ˜ ¸ is a strictly decreasing function of ¹, a corresponding
value for ¹ above which it is certain that the store will be preferred to the auction can be
determined:






, the store dominates the auction.
Proof: Noting that ˜ ¸ = ¸
¹(1 ¡ e¡¹T) < ¸
¹ and using the result of Proposition 12 and the
























Proposition 13 conﬁrms the basic intuition that running an auction, which requires a large
number of bidders to work well, becomes less interesting than the store if bidders are not ready
19to wait because they can ﬁnd opportunities to purchase the good elsewhere. It also implies that
regardless of the distribution of bidders’ valuations, if both the discount rate ® and the bidder
arrival rate ¸ are reduced proportionally, the value of ¹ above which the store is guaranteed to
dominate the auction falls by the same proportion.
To understand the basic intuition behind proposition 13, is instructive to consider a limiting
case in which the discount rate is very low. In such a setting, ignoring outside options would
lead to the recommendation that an auction should be run. However, using (41), a suﬃcient
condition for the store to dominate the auction when ® ! 0 is that ¹ > ¸. The reason is that
if this condition is satisﬁed, the average time 1=¹ until bidders ﬁnd an alternative to purchase
the good elsewhere is lower than the average bidder interarrival time, 1=¸. As a result, the
probability of having two bidders if an auction is run is very low and the seller prefers to sell
the good using a store.
The result in proposition 13 is consistent with empirical evidence. “Commodity” goods,
such as groceries, are seldom sold through auctions because of the close availability of many
substitutes and the size of waiting costs (immediacy is important to buyers). On the other
hand, “unique” items such as original artwork, for which substitutes are diﬃcult to ﬁnd and
immediacy low, are commonly sold through auctions. Note that once again, two goods with
identical distributions of bidder valuations can be sold optimally either using a store or an
auction, depending on the size of waiting costs and whether alternative purchase opportunities
are available to the bidders or not.
The next result shows that if the discount rate is suﬃciently low, the auction will be the
preferred structure.
Proposition 14: Suppose that ¸ À ¹. There exists some ® ¸ 0 so that the auction
dominates the store.
Proof: Note that when ® ! 0, the payoﬀ from the store is ΠS = ¼1, whereas the payoﬀ
from the auction is
P1
N=0 e¡˜ ¸(T) ˜ ¸(T)N
N! ¼N. Also, since ¸ À ¹, ˜ ¸ can be made suﬃciently large
so that ¼(˜ ¸) > ¼1 by setting a large auction closing time T. Therefore, using arguments similar
to those in the proof of proposition 8, one can establish that the auction dominates for low ®.
Note that a value of ˜ ¸ strictly (and possibly signiﬁcantly) above 1 must be achievable for the
auction to dominate for low ®. The reason is that because of the concavity of ¼(˜ ¸), Jensen’s
inequality implies that ¼(1) < ¼1, and the auction cannot dominate the store if ˜ ¸ < 1. As a
result, the condition ¸ > ¹ would not be suﬃcient to guarantee that the auction could dominate
20the store, and ¸ À ¹ is required.
Proposition 14 implies that other things equal, goods that are perishable or become obsolete
quickly should be sold using stores rather than auctions, while goods whose value does not fall
through time should be sold using auctions. This prediction is consistent with the empirical
evidence. Artwork, for example, is hardly perishable, and the auction is therefore the preferred
structure. On the other hand, vegetables are typically sold using stores (as mentioned above,
fresh ﬁsh and ﬂowers are sold through auctions because of the thickness of the market).
4 Summary and Conclusion
Auctions have the undesirable feature that they impose waiting costs on bidders and give rise
to false trading. As a result, the seller will often prefer running a retail store to running an
auction. Three factors are shown to play a critical role in the seller’s choice between store and
auction: (1) the perishability of the good and discounting, (2) the thickness of the market, and
(3) the extent of buyers’ waiting costs and the availability of alternatives. More speciﬁcally,
the following can be established:
1. If the seller’s time preference, the perishability of the good being sold or the speed at
which it becomes obsolete are high, then the store tends to be the preferred structure.
2. If the market is very thick in the sense that many bidders arrive per unit time, the auction
tends to be preferred to the store. This prediction consistent with the widespread use of
auctions in the California real estate market in the late 1990’s.
3. High bidders’ waiting costs and the availability of alternatives to purchase an identical or
similar good elsewhere tend to favor the store. This result is consistent with a number
of real-life phenomena, such as the fact that goods that have close substitutes (such as
groceries) are almost always sold through store structures, while goods that are “unique”
in the sense of having no close substitutes (of which artwork is a classical example)
are often sold using auctions. Waiting costs and the risk of false trading provide an
explanation for the extreme dominance of store structures in practice.
An important implication of these results is that identical goods (having the same distri-
bution of buyers’ valuations and the same perishability) may be sold diﬀerently depending on
the market environment. In an environment in which arrivals are frequent and alternatives
21diﬃcult to ﬁnd, the good will be sold using an auction. However, the store may be the optimal
structure to sell the same good if the arrival rate is low and alternatives are hard to ﬁnd.
The development of markets on the Internet provides an interesting application of this anal-
ysis. At ﬁrst sight, the Internet would seem to favor auctions because it allows several arrival
streams to be pooled together, at least for goods that can be shipped. On the other hand,
Internet technology makes searching for alternatives easier, which tends to favor stores. This
factor can explain why stores have become more and more common on the Internet in the last
few years, with even originally all-auction electronic marketplaces such as ebay now allowing
sellers to run retail stores rather than auctions.
22Appendix
In this appendix, we derive the distribution of the number of bidders participating in the auction
at time T. To do so, the auction is best viewed as a queuing system in which customers arrive
at a rate ¸ and each customer in the system leaves at a rate ¹. Let qN(t) denote the probability
that there are N bidders in the system at time t. These probabilities must satisfy the following
system of Chapman-Kolmogorov diﬀerential equations:
dq0(t)
dt
= ¡¸q0(t) + ¹q1(t); (N = 0) (43)
dqN(t)
dt
= ¡(¸ + N¹)qN(t) + (N + 1)¹qN+1(t) + ¸qN¡1(t); (N > 0) (44)
The intuition for this system of diﬀerential equations is as follows: if the system is currently
empty (N = 0), there is a probability ¸ per unit time that a bidder will show up, reducing
the probability that the system remains empty by ¸. On the other hand, if there is one bidder
in the system (N = 1), there is a probability ¹ per unit time that a bidder will leave it and
bring it to state 0. Together, these factors imply (43). More generally, if there are currently
N bidders in the system, there is a probability ¸ per unit time that a bidder will arrive and
bring it to state N + 1, and a probability N¹ that one of the bidders will leave it and bring
it to state N ¡ 1. On the other hand, if the system is in state N ¡ 1, there is a probability ¸
that one bidder will arrive and bring the system to state N. Finally, if there are N +1 bidders
in the system, there is a probability (N + 1)¹ that one of the bidders will depart. This then
implies (44).

















N=0 zNqN(t), this equation can be rewritten as
@Q
@t
+ ¹(z ¡ 1)
@Q
@z
= ¸(z ¡ 1)Q (46)
This equation can then be solved with the initial condition that there are no bidders at time









To determine the state probabilities at time t, qN(t), take a Taylor series expansion of Q around
z = 0, holding t constant. The probability of state N will be proportional to the coeﬃcients of
















































































Deﬁning ˜ ¸(t) = ¸
¹(1¡e¡¹t), the state probabilities (51) can be recognized as those of a Poisson





which is the result used in the text.
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